1. (S/SFOR) SITUATION. This FRAGO initiates actions necessary to enhance force protection in MND(N) in preparation for possible threats against SFOR. Updates to FRAGO 4987b are in bold.
a. (S/SFOR) Threat Forces.
(1) (S/SFOR) General Threat Situation. Based on last Fall's NATO warnings, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is on notice to abide by the requirements of the OCT 98 cease-fire. Despite this fact, the FRY continues to hold its advantage and position along LOCs to support operations in Kosovo against the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). To prevent additional escalation of fighting, NATO is prepared to take action to halt FRY counter insurgency operations in Kosovo. As a result of direct NATO intervention in Kosovo, the Republic of Srpska (RS) or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) may act against the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with particular efforts at targeting US and NATO personnel. RS rhetoric concerning NATO intervention in Kosovo is currently limited to senior RS leadership. Critical of the threat of military intervention, RS leadership, in the past, has insinuated that events in Kosovo may have implications within the RS. Any level of NATO intervention into Kosovo, Albania, or the FRY could stimulate a hostile reaction from the either Bosnian-Serb population or Serbians in the FRY. NATO activities could lead to repercussions against NATO member nations in MND (N) area of responsibility.
I. (S/SFOR) FRY. Milosevic's center of gravity is his ability to incite Serbian nationalism to a fever pitch based on events in Kosovo. As a result, Milosevic will focus an allout propaganda effort against the SFOR and NATO in the world media. The FRY will attempt to stop the attack or prevent future attacks by portraying the FRY as the apparent victim ofUCK violence and influencing Bosnian Serbs to organize riots and protests in the RS. The FRY maymobilize 1st Army assets around Belgrade to show force, protect its borders, and reassure its citizens.
2. (S/SFOR) RS. Bosnian-Serb political hard-liners and other influential leaders may try to organize rallies, demonstrations, and protests throughout the AOR in attempts to show support for the FRY. Demonstrators and the media may spread anti-SFOR rhetoric against the US and SFOR, directly linking SFOR with NATO's actions. Demonstrations and riots could disrupt SFOR freedom of movement, and possibly threaten base camps and PDSS, SOCCE teams, and NGOs/IOs from NATO member countries in RS cities.
(b) (S/SFOR) Most Dangerous. The most dangerous enemy course of action against MND (N) is RS or FRY retaliatory air strike or indirect fire against MND (N) base camps. US base camps and assets are the most probable targets. The FRY could attempt air strikes originating from military bases around Belgrade, or other locations in Serbia. Additionally, an individual or group may target Americans, SFOR soldiers and civilians, or other "soft targets" with a hostile act or acts designed to injure or kill and break the resolve of the Multinational coalition. Anticipate the initial threat from air attacks to diminish after 36 hours of action in Kosovo.
b. (C) Friendly. SFOR forces in BH must be capable of providing minimal self-defense against possible air threats. NATO Air Forces will maintain strategic air defense throughout operations in BiH; however, these air forces may not maintain absolute protection from all air threats.
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